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Douglas Porpora’s challenging book is for readers who are devoted to sociology but are 
troubled by current guiding assumptions and their negative effects. His concerns about 
American sociology raise questions about how far they apply in Britain too, when there is 
ever more need for social science to provide convincing valid information for the public and 
policy makers.     
 
Porpora summarises many current problems and disconnections in sociology into the 
following widely-held myths. Ethnography and historical narrative can only explore and 
describe but not explain. Social research should be value neutral. There is no truth, only 
relative social constructions. The most important scientific questions are empirical not 
conceptual. Sociology should replace conscious embodied individual agents with structures, 
variables, habitus, or with deconstructed or post-human agency. There is no difference 
between structure and culture or structure and action. And many sociologists can dismiss 
statistical analysis as being the distinct methodology of positivism.  
 
By unravelling and refuting the myths, Porpora shows the value of critical realism to expose 
their gaps and contradictions and to offer tenable remedies and alternatives. He sets out 
seven philosophical commitments, theories central to sociology as a social science. First 
there is the humanist recognition that each agent is an embodied centre of conscious 
experiences, intentions and motives. In contrast, several sociological approaches transfer 
agency away from agents onto structures, or determining factors, or variables. Second is 
respect for the objective human relations or social structures which connect people, such as 
competition, power and inequality. These require analysis that gives convincing accounts of 
both structure and agency, their origins and interactions. Third are the intensive methods in 
observations and interviews, and fourth the extensive or macro methods too often 
separated or set in opposition. Porpora advocates greater trust in intensive ethnography, 
narrative and history as sources of valid causal explanations, and less trust in extensive 
statistical correlations as either explanations or predictors, with intensive and extensive 
research methods being complementary and interacting.   
 
Metatheory, the fifth commitment, involves explicit critical analysis of the philosophical 
theories and tacit assumptions that underlie all social research. These include questions 
about reality, existence, belief, proof and accuracy, how we can know and understand 
phenomena, which perspectives and methods to select and how they relate to one another. 
The sixth commitment, truth, is neglected or avoided by relativist sociological perspectives 
but valued by positivists, Marxists and the Frankfurt School, by pragmatists and critical 
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realists. Porpora reviews their differing forms of truth. Finally, there is value orientation that 
recognises the inherent values in social facts.  It sees objectivity as fair, open and impartial, 
but not neutral, such as when attempts to withhold judgment on the abuses of power can 
only inadvertently support them.  
 
Porpora reviews many confusions that arise when sociologists overlook these commitments, 
which explicitly or implicitly relate to all sociology. Although much good social science can 
be achieved despite faulty premisses, it will not be the best that it could be, Porpora 
contends. He adds that the first essential practical step in research is to address the 
philosophical commitments integral to each main sociological perspective or paradigm if 
sociology is to be rescued from being a ‘sham discipline, one that looks like a science but is 
not’ (p. 188).  The belief that data can be collected, collated, counted, reported and 
brokered, uncontaminated by ideology or theory, denies how beliefs and values covertly 
influence all these ‘objective’ processes.  
  
Reconstructing Sociology analyses how sociology loses realism and relevance if it is seen 
primarily as the means of producing research methods and findings and not also as a 
theory-based social science. Main sociological perspectives are reviewed in detail, including 
positivism, the postmodern group, pragmatism, interpretivism, social constructionism, actor 
network theory, Marxism/Frankfurt School and Bourdieu. A table (p. 192) summarises the 
whole book by showing how each perspective explicitly addresses the key philosophical 
commitments, or else has no explicit position on them or support for them. Only critical 
realism seriously addresses all the commitments, although it is not an alternative 
sociological perspective but a philosophy that can assist us in analysing and clarifying the 
scientific strengths and weaknesses, validity or invalidity, in each sociological perspective.  
 
Porpora shows how critical realism adjudicates across the plethora of sociological paradigms 
to create new consistency, which can strengthen the validity and usefulness of our 
discipline. Imagine governments redefining obesity or poor mental health from medical 
problems into social problems, to be tackled by wide-ranging interdisciplinary research 
coordinated through a coherent framework of sociology and covering, for example, the 
related economics and politics, industries and services, healthcare and urban planning, with 
studies of the complex everyday life of the groups and individuals concerned.   
  
Although sociologists may influence detailed policies, our warnings of the present and likely 
future dangers of social discord, repression and inequality, besides potential ways to reduce 
and prevent these ills, seldom appear to influence major policies. Sociology is edged out of 
public debates when economists and psychologists are introduced as self-evidently 
respected scientists, whereas sociologists, if they are included at all, seem more likely to 
evoke scepticism than respect. When sociologists of different persuasions, from positivists 
3 
 
to postmodernists, are unable to convince one another of the validity of their work, they are 
still less likely to convince the rest of society.  
   
One defence of our discipline’s diversity is that its adaptable rich variety can embrace 
numerous theories, methods and topics. However, variety does not preclude coherence, 
and coherence does not demand narrow uniformity - like the neoclassical mantras that now 
monopolise economics. Medicine is a hugely varied discipline yet, fortunately for society’s 
healthcare, it is unified by powerful common values and theories about causal realities. By 
contrast, and unfortunately for society’s wellbeing, sociology is split apart not only by 
disagreements but, more seriously, by basic contradictions: positivism accepts pristine 
independent social facts and aims to discover general laws, whereas interpretivism sees 
only local contingent variety; statistics and experiments are set against ethnography; 
sociology is variously taken to be value-free, relativist or a moral endeavour.  
 
Sociology is hardly convincing to any group, from students to politicians, when it is 
presented as a random pick-and-mix medley of approaches. Societies urgently need 
sociology to position its many valuable insights and methods in relation to one another, 
showing how they connect and interact within larger relations, to be more like a coherent 
jigsaw puzzle in progress, rather than a heap of pieces. Reconstructing Sociology provides a 
wealth of ideas to promote a theory-based social science.  
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